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A HIGHER AUTHORITY: HOW THE 
FEDERAL RELIGIOUS LAND USE AND 
INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS ACT 
AFFECTS STATE CONTROL OVER 
RELIGIOUS LAND USE CONFLICTS 
Karen L. Antos* 
Abstract: The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 
(RLUIPA) provides heightened protections for religious institutions that 
seek to build or expand their facilities in excess of local zoning regula-
tions. Although RLUIPA claims on its face that it does not preempt state 
protections for reglious land uses, more and more religious organizations 
have elected to bring suit under RLUIPA in addition to or in lieu of state 
laws. This Note focuses on Massachussetts and Washington as representa-
tive examples of states’ religious land use protections and examines the 
effect of RLUIPA on those protections. The Note suggest that RLUIPA 
may unintentionally preempt state laws, particularly where states have 
chosen not to act. 
Introduction 
 Although conflicts between religious institutions and local land use 
regulations have existed for nearly as long as local governments have 
been implementing zoning regulations, the frequency of such conflicts 
has escalated in the past decade.1 Previously, Congress had intervened 
to balance the competing concerns of religious groups and local gov-
ernments through sweeping federal legislation.2 However, Congress’s 
latest attempt, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 
                                                                                                                      
* Articles Editor, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2007–08. 
The author wishes to thank Jonathan Witten for providing the idea for this topic and her 
fiancé and family for their support. 
1 See Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 373 (1926); Attorney Gen. v. Dover, 100 
N.E.2d 1, 3 (Mass. 1951); Julie M. Osborn, RLUIPA’s Land Use Provisions: Congress’s Unconsti-
tutional Response to City of Boerne, 28-FALL Environs Envtl. L. & Pol’y J. 155, 162 (2004); 
Cheryl Runyon et al., Religious Land Use—State and Federal Legislation, N.C.S.L. St. Legis. 
Rep., Dec. 2000, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/natres/SLR2514.htm. 
2 See Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 1993 
U.S.C.C.A.N. (107 Stat.) 1488, invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); 
H.R. 1691, 106th Cong. (1st Sess. 1999); H.R. 4019, 105th Cong. (2d Sess. 1998). 
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of 2000 (RLUIPA), is a narrowly tailored statute that only addresses re-
ligious protections in conflicts involving land use and prisoners’ rights.3 
Despite its effort to allay conflicts between religious institutions and 
local governments, and notwithstanding its limited applications, RLUIPA 
often exacerbates conflicts between these groups.4 Conflicts arise be-
cause RLUIPA enables religious groups to receive approval for con-
struction projects in situations where state law would have allowed local 
governments to prevent the construction.5 
 Since its inception, several interest groups have funded litigation 
under RLUIPA to encourage religious institutions to fight adverse land 
use decisions.6 While not all challenges under RLUIPA have been suc-
cessful, many religious facilities have been able to use RLUIPA, or even 
the mere threat of litigation under the Act, to persuade municipalities 
to grant special use permits that were originally denied.7 As a result of 
such litigation, religious institutions are able to engage in large-scale, 
multi-use construction to a much greater extent than nonreligious in-
stitutions would have been able to on the same parcels of land.8 
                                                                                                                      
3 Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–
2000cc-5, 2000cc-1 (2000). Only the land use provisions of RLUIPA will be addressed in 
this Note. 
4 Marci A. Hamilton, God vs. the Gavel: Religion and the Rule of Law 97–98 
(2005). 
5 Id. at 98. 
6 Id.; see RLUIPA.com, http://www.rluipa.com (last visited Apr. 27, 2008). This site, 
operated by the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, provides updates on media coverage, 
published briefs, scholarships, and current and future cases involving RLUIPA. Id. 
7 Hamilton, supra note 4, at 98–99; see RLUIPA.com, supra, note 6. 
8 See Hamilton, supra note 4, at 82. Even without relying on RLUIPA, several churches 
were able to include bookstores, coffee houses, hotels, theaters, and even a McDonald’s 
within religious facilities. Id. at 80; see Scott Thumma, Exploring the Megachurch Phenomena: 
Their Characteristics and Cultural Context, Hartford Inst. for Religion Research (1996), 
http://hirr.hartsem.edu/bookshelf/thumma_article2.html. Using RLUIPA, religious insti-
tutions have successfully gained permission for a 5050-square-foot religious institution in a 
single-family residential district, appealed an adverse ruling that prevented the religious 
institution from building a 650-student Christian school located in a semi-rural area, and 
received $72,214.24 in attorney’s fees for the denial of a permit to operate a religiously 
affiliated bed and breakfast near a hospital. DiLaura v. Twp. of Ann Arbor, 471 F.3d 666, 
668–69 (6th Cir. 2006); Hamilton, supra note 4, at 104; Pamela A. MacLean, Courts Strug-
gle over Definition of ‘Undue Burden’ in Zoning Act, Nat’l L.J., Feb. 19, 2007, at 1, 1; see 
RLUIPA.com, supra, note 6 (listing many other conflicts resolved through the use of 
RLUIPA). Additionally, religious institutions have sought permission for construction of 
the following in residential neighborhoods: a hundred-child day care facility, a forty-person 
homeless shelter, and a religious institution that would increase traffic dramatically. Ham-
ilton, supra note 4, at 99–101. 
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 Without RLUIPA, these land use conflicts would be decided ac-
cording to state laws.9 Several states have extended heightened protec-
tions to religious land uses similar to those available under RLUIPA.10 
Other states simply have never considered whether to extend special 
protection to religious land uses.11 Finally, several states have declined 
to extend heightened protections to religious land uses after consider-
ing laws resembling RLUIPA.12 Claims under RLUIPA are available to 
religious groups in all states, even those states that intentionally did not 
pass laws offering heightened protections for religious uses.13 
 This Note seeks to demonstrate that although RLUIPA states that 
it does not preempt state laws, the result of its implementation is es-
sentially the same as if it had specifically preempted state control over 
religious land use laws in states without land use protections resem-
bling RLUIPA. Part I of this Note examines the scope of local control 
over land use issues and the intersection of land use and religious is-
sues. It then provides an overview of protections for religious land use 
issues that existed prior to 2000. Part II gives an overview of the crea-
tion and implementation of RLUIPA. Part III describes the various 
religious land use protections available at the state level, with a par-
ticular focus on Massachusetts and Washington. Part IV uses the cases 
from Part III to demonstrate how RLUIPA dramatically changes reli-
gious land use analysis, particularly in states without any religious land 
use protections in place. Finally, Part V concludes that, while RLUIPA 
creates nationwide consistency, it thrusts religious land use issues out-
side the traditional realm of state and local control. 
I. Local Land-Use Regulation 
 Compared to other areas of modern law, land-use regulation is 
unusual because control is exercised primarily at the local level.14 The 
creation and modification of zones, as well as exemptions or exceptions 
to a particular zone, have “always been treated as . . . local matter[s].”15 
For land use controls to be enacted at the local level, the state govern-
ment must delegate power to the local government because “local gov-
                                                                                                                      
9 See Hamilton, supra note 4, at 104. 
10 Runyon et al., supra note 1. 
11 See id. 
12 Id. 
13 See Hamilton, supra note 4, at 109. 
14 Daniel P. Selmi & James A. Kushner, Land Use Regulation: Cases and Materi-
als 29 (2d ed. 2004). 
15 Pendergast v. Bd. of Appeals, 120 N.E.2d 916, 918 (Mass. 1954). 
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ernments do not have inherent powers but are limited to those granted 
by a state constitution or legislature.”16 Land use regulation is an aspect 
of the state’s police power—the ability of the state to protect public 
health, safety, morals, and general welfare.17 The state government, 
rather than investing the power in administrative agencies, grants deci-
sionmaking power to local officials who make most land use decisions.18 
A zoning regulation is an appropriate use of the police power when it 
reasonably and substantially relates to the “police power objectives of 
protecting public safety, health, morals and welfare.”19 
 There are three circumstances in which a municipality can exercise 
its police power: (1) when an activity is expressly authorized through a 
delegation of power from the state; (2) when an activity is reasonably 
necessary to perform a delegated activity; (3) and when an activity is 
“essential to the declared objects and purposes” of the local govern-
ment.20 Because “there is no inherent municipal power to zone,” a mu-
nicipality must have directly or indirectly received a grant of power 
from the state before passing zoning ordinances or bylaws.21 
A. Limitations to Local Control of Land Use Regulations 
 The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that local control of zon-
ing provides a method for achieving “a satisfactory quality of life in 
both urban and rural communities.”22 By permitting a local govern-
ment to exercise domain over its community, local control of land use 
regulations provides for the creation of “zones where family values, 
youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make 
the area a sanctuary for people.”23 While the umbrella of land-use regu-
lation applies to zoning and historic preservation laws, its scope is not 
                                                                                                                      
16 Brian W. Blaesser et al., Land Use and the Constitution: Principles for 
Planning Practice 16 (1989) [hereinafter Blaesser et al., Land Use and the Consti-
tution]. The concept that a local government must be delegated its powers by the state is 
known as Dillon’s Rule. Id. 
17 E.g., Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 125 (1978); Blaesser 
et al., Land Use and the Constitution, supra note 16, at 16; Barlow Burke, Under-
standing the Law of Zoning and Land Use Controls 3 (2002). 
18 Selmi & Kushner, supra note 14, at 29. 
19 See Runyon et al., supra note 1. 
20 Burke, supra note 17, at 5. 
21 Blaesser et al., Land Use and the Constitution, supra note 16, at 16; Burke, 
supra note 17, at 5, 7. 
22 Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 68 (1981). 
23 Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974); see John M. Baker & Mehmet K. 
Konar-Steenberg, “Drawn from Local Knowledge . . . and Conformed to Local Wants”: Zoning and 
Incremental Reform of Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 38 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 1, 39 (2006). 
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unlimited.24 For example, construction of roadways is not considered a 
form of land-use regulation and, thus, is not affected by statutes limit-
ing local discretion in land-use regulation.25 
 Moreover, while local governments have typically had great discre-
tion in their land use decisions, local officials do not have unlimited 
authority to shape and apply zoning restrictions.26 Rather, zoning au-
thority must be “exercised within constitutional limits.”27 A determina-
tion of whether an authority exceeded constitutional limits is based on 
a review of the nature of the right “assertedly threatened or violated,” 
not the power used by the government in threatening that right.28 
B. Land-Use Regulation and Religion 
 Most confrontations between land-use regulation and religion 
arise because of the different levels of government responsible for the 
creation and implementation of regulations.29 Specifically, state or local 
governments enact land use regulations and control land use through 
the police power, while federal law resolves conflicts involving burdens 
on religious freedoms.30 Laws designed to ensure fair treatment for re-
ligious institutions have proliferated as a form of “religious affirmative 
action.”31 In some cases, legislatures passed laws favoring religion spe-
cifically to address “an actual incident of discrimination.”32 In the land 
use context, these laws generally either reduce or streamline the re-
quirements that a religious institution must follow when building or 
renovating religious facilities.33 
 The conflict between land-use regulation and religion has led to 
several common clashes between religious institutions and local gov-
ernments.34 Some disputes focus on historic preservation laws: where 
                                                                                                                      
24 See Brian W. Blaesser et al., Federal Land Use Law & Litigation 615 (2008) 
[hereinafter Blaesser et al., Federal Land Use]. 
25 Prater v. City of Burnside, 289 F.3d 417, 422–34 (6th Cir. 2002); see Blaesser et al., 
Federal Land Use, supra note 24, at 619 & n.12. 
26 Wendie L. Kellington, Historical Evolution of the RLUIPA, in Proceedings of the In-
stitute on Planning, Zoning and Eminent Domain 12-1, § 12.08, at 12-24 (Safia Ahmed 
ed., 2006). 
27 Schad, 452 U.S. at 68 (internal quotations omitted). 
28 Id.; Kellington, supra note 26, at 12-25. 
29 See Runyon et al., supra note 1. 
30 Id. 
31 Jerold S. Kayden, Statutory Preference for Religious Land Use: Divining What Is Religious 
and What Is Reasonable, Land Use L. & Zoning Dig., Sept. 2001, at 3, 4. 
32 Boyajian v. Gatzunis, 212 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2000); see Kayden, supra note 31, at 4. 
33 Blaesser et al., Federal Land Use, supra note 24, at 708. 
34 See id. 
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a religious institution wants to renovate a building that, if used for a 
nonsectarian purpose, would be prohibited from undergoing renova-
tion because of its location within an historic preservation zone.35 
Other conflicts center on the application of basic zoning restrictions 
to the construction of new buildings, such as churches and peripheral 
facilities.36 Finally, many cases focus on whether to give religious ex-
emptions from zoning laws to nonreligious facilities run by churches, 
such as office buildings and treatment centers.37 
 Challenges that religious institutions bring to land use regulations 
are litigated under either the Establishment Clause or the Free Exercise 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.38 The Establishment Clause and the 
Free Exercise Clause are frequently in tension and are the source of 
friction between freedom of religion and protection against govern-
mental establishment of religion in the federal government.39 These 
two clauses, by nature of their disparate protections, require regulators 
to avoid both laws limiting the free exercise of religion and laws appear-
ing to favor the establishment of religion.40 
                                                                                                                      
35 E.g., Keeler v. Mayor of Cumberland, 940 F. Supp. 879, 880 (D. Md. 1996); First 
Covenant Church v. City of Seattle (First Covenant II ), 840 P.2d 174, 177 (Wash. 1992). 
36 E.g., Castle Hills First Baptist Church v. City of Castle Hills, 2004 WL 546792, at *2 
(W.D. Tex. 2004); Martin v. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints, 747 N.E.2d 131, 133 (Mass. 2001). 
37 See, e.g., N. Pac. Union Conf. Ass’n of Seventh Day Adventists v. Clark County, 74 
P.3d 140, 142 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003); Blaesser et al., Federal Land Use, supra note 24, 
at 707–09. 
38 Blaesser et al., Federal Land Use, supra note 24, at 593, 603; Robert A. Sedler, 
The First Amendment and Land Use: An Overview, in Protecting Free Speech and Expres-
sion 1, 10 (Daniel R. Mandelker & Rebecca L. Rubin eds., 2001). The Establishment 
Clause states, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.” U.S. 
Const. amend. I. The Supreme Court has interpreted this language to require a separa-
tion of church and state. Selmi & Kushner, supra note 14, at 350. The determination of 
whether a law violates the Establishment Clause is guided by the Lemon test, which requires 
legislation to have a “secular legislative purpose,” to have a “principal or primary effect” 
that “neither advances nor inhibits religion,” and to avoid “excessive government entan-
glement with religion.” Id.; see Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971). The Es-
tablishment Clause only applies to land use cases when a “regulation has the effect of pre-
ferring religion over non-religion.” Sedler, supra, at 10. For the purposes of this Note, the 
primary importance of the Establishment Clause is that it is frequently in tension with the 
Free Exercise Clause. 
39 Blaesser et al., Federal Land Use, supra note 24, at 603; see David L. Callies et 
al., Cases and Material on Land Use 441 (4th ed. 2004). Although this tension exists, as 
of now, no court has found RLUIPA to violate the Establishment Clause. Blaesser et al., 
Federal Land Use, supra note 24, at 627–28. 
40 Blaesser et al., Federal Land Use, supra note 24, at 593, 603; Callies et al., su-
pra note 39, at 441. 
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 The Free Exercise Clause, which provides that “Congress shall 
make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise” of religion, limits a 
state’s control over matters of religious freedom.41 To violate the Free 
Exercise Clause, a government action must force the claimant to ei-
ther disobey a belief of his religion or abstain from a requirement of 
his religion.42 Prior to 1990, courts held that the Free Exercise Clause 
required a review of infringements against religious practices using 
strict scrutiny.43 For a decision disfavoring religious practices to be 
upheld, the government was required to show that the chosen 
method of enforcement was “the least restrictive means of achieving 
some governmental interest.”44 
 The application of strict scrutiny in cases involving the Free Ex-
ercise Clause ended with the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment 
Division v. Smith.45 There, two employees were denied unemployment 
benefits because of their use of peyote, an illegal drug, at a Native 
American Church ceremony.46 The Court found that the employees 
could legally be denied unemployment benefits because the Free Ex-
ercise Clause was not intended to protect illegal conduct undertaken 
within a religious ceremony.47 As long as a law prohibiting an activity 
did not specifically target religious activities for disparate treatment, 
the states were “free to regulate.”48 In Smith, the Court altered its 
standard of review for free exercise cases, requiring the government 
to show only a rational basis for passing a generally applicable law.49 
As a result of the changes in Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence cre-
ated by the Court’s decision in Smith, exceptions to neutral laws could 
only be granted by a full legislative process, rather than through the 
permitting process.50 The Court determined that this was the appro-
                                                                                                                      
41 U.S. Const. amend. I; Selmi & Kushner, supra note 14, at 350. 
42 Blaesser et al., Federal Land Use, supra note 24, at 603. 
43 Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981); 
Selmi & Kushner, supra note 14, at 351. 
44 Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718; Selmi & Kushner, supra note 14, at 351. The requirement 
that the government show a compelling interest and lack of restrictive alternative has been 
acknowledged by the Supreme Court to be the “most demanding test known to constitu-
tional law.” City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997). 
45 See generally Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (altering the standard of 
review for Free Exercise Clause cases). 
46 Id. at 874. The Court did recognize that the use of peyote was part of the religious 
traditions of the respondent’s Native American culture. Id. 
47 Id. at 878–79. 
48 Id. at 879. 
49 See Runyon et al., supra note 1. 
50 See 494 U.S. at 898 (O’Connor, J., concurring); Selmi & Kushner, supra note 14, at 
351. For a regulation to undergo the full legislative process, it must be introduced, ap-
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priate procedure, despite the increased burden on minority religious 
groups to seek popular support to gain protections.51 
 Four years later, Congress reacted to the Smith decision’s reduction 
of protections for the free exercise of religion by passing the Religious 
Freedom and Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993.52 RFRA reinstated the 
strict scrutiny standard for review of free exercise challenges, and was 
generally viewed as a direct response to the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Smith.53 However, RFRA existed for only four years before it was 
struck down by the Supreme Court in City of Boerne v. Flores.54 In City of 
Boerne, the Court found that RFRA exceeded the power granted to 
Congress under the Fourteenth Amendment.55 Specifically, the Court 
held that Congress overreached its powers when it applied RFRA to the 
states.56 By changing the standard associated with the Free Exercise 
Clause, Congress moved beyond enforcement and attempted to change 
the meaning of an amendment.57 In overturning RFRA, the Court re-
turned to the free exercise analysis established in Smith.58 
                                                                                                                      
proved by both the House of Representatives and the Senate, and signed into law by the 
President. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. Prior to Smith, even if a court found that a law was 
neutrally applicable, the court was permitted to balance the government’s interests against 
the effect of the regulation on the religious practices. See Robin Cheryl Miller, Annotation, 
What Laws Are Neutral and of General Applicability Within Meaning of Employment Div., Dept. 
of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 108 L. Ed. 2d 876, 
167 A.L.R. Fed. 663, § 2(a) (2001). After Smith, courts may no longer balance the harm to 
religion if a law is generally applicable. Id.; see 494 U.S. at 890. 
51 Smith, 494 U.S. at 890; see Selmi & Kushner, supra note 14, at 351. 
52 Selmi & Kushner, supra note 14, at 352; see Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. (107 Stat.) 1488, invalidated by 
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
53 Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993; Selmi & Kushner, supra note 
14, at 352; Alan C. Weinstein, Land Use Regulation of Religious Institutions: Balancing Planning 
Concerns with Constitutional and Statutory Safeguards for Religious Freedom, in Protecting 
Free Speech and Expression, supra note 38, at 145, 145. 
54 521 U.S. at 536. The Court in City of Boerne found that enacting RFRA exceeded the 
scope of Congress’s powers under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment because 
Congress did not have the power to overturn the Supreme Court precedent set out in 
Smith. Id.; Patricia E. Salkin, Anderson’s American Law of Zoning, § 12:21A: The Religious Land 
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 2 Anderson’s Am. Law Zoning § 12:21A (4th 
ed. 2006). 
55 521 U.S. at 536. 
56 Id. at 516, 536. 
57 Id. at 519; Weinstein, supra note 53, at 152. 
58 Selmi & Kushner, supra note 14, at 352. 
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II. RLUIPA: Statutory History and Overview 
 In 2000, Congress enacted RLUIPA, another regulation designed 
to protect the free exercise of religion, this time specifically in land-use 
regulation and the religious rights of prisoners.59 Like RFRA, RLUIPA 
statutorily reinstates strict scrutiny analysis for review of conflicts be-
tween land use regulations and religion.60 Unlike RFRA, however, 
RLUIPA is narrowly tailored, as it only addresses land use regulations 
and rights of the imprisoned, in an effort by Congress to avoid exceed-
ing its powers.61 
 RLUIPA prohibits the government from imposing or implement-
ing a substantial burden on a religious exercise through a land use 
regulation.62 To defeat a challenge under RLUIPA, the government 
must show that it acted in furtherance of a compelling governmental 
interest and used the least restrictive means of furthering that inter-
est.63 RLUIPA applies to any land use regulation where the “govern-
ment makes, or has in place formal or informal procedures or practices 
that permit the government to make, individualized assessments of the 
proposed uses for the property involved.”64 In effect, any discretionary 
permit, such as a variance or special permit, would fall within RLUIPA’s 
scope.65 
                                                                                                                      
59 Religious Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc, 
2000cc-1 (2000). 
60 See Selmi & Kushner, supra note 14, at 352; Kayden, supra note 31, at 4. 
61 146 Cong. Rec. S6678-02 (daily ed. July 13, 2000) (statement of Sen. Hatch). Unlike 
the narrowly tailored RLUIPA, RFRA applied to every type of regulation. Id. Although 
RLUIPA addresses both land use laws and conditions for institutionalized persons, this 
Note will only address the Act as applied to land-use regulation. See id. RLUIPA applies in 
three circumstances: (1) where a “state program receives Federal financial assistance”; (2) 
a substantial burden “imposed by a local law affects or would affect” interstate commerce; 
or (3) “the substantial burden is imposed in the implementation of a land use regulation 
or system of land use regulations” where the government makes “individualized assess-
ments of the proposed uses for the property involved.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)(A)–(C); 
see Int’l Church of the Foursquare Gospel v. City of San Leandro, No. C 07-3605 PJH, 2007 
WL 2904046, at *10–11 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2007). 
62 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1). 
63 Id. § 2000cc(a)(1)(A)–(B). 
64 Id. § 2000cc(a)(2)(C). 
65 See id.; Blaesser et al., Federal Land Use, supra note 24, at 633–37. RLUIPA does 
not specifically define what type of burden on religious exercise would constitute a sub-
stantial burden. Daniel J. Curtin, Jr. & Cecily T. Talbert, Curtin’s California Land 
Use and Planning Law 55 (25th ed. 2005). In Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of 
Chicago, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit imposed a more narrow defini-
tion of substantial burden. 342 F.3d 752, 761 (7th Cir. 2003). In order to constitute a sub-
stantial burden on religion, a land use regulation must make religious exercise “effectively 
impracticable.” Id. The U.S. Courts of Appeal for the Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits 
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 Under RLUIPA, the burden of proof first rests on the religious in-
stitution to demonstrate that a substantial burden exists.66 Once the 
religious institution makes that showing, the burden shifts to the mu-
nicipality to prove that the regulation falls under the compelling gov-
ernmental interest exception.67 RLUIPA is not intended as preemptive 
law; it neither preempts state law nor repeals federal law, provided that 
such laws are at least as protective of religious exercise as RLUIPA.68 
 Opponents of RLUIPA criticize the loss of local control over zon-
ing resulting from what they view as federal preemption of local con-
trol and an “assault on . . . federalism.”69 Opponents argue that land-
use regulation is a local issue and that federal religious protections 
from land use laws conflict with the Establishment Clause because re-
ligious uses are placed in a special class.70 Anti-RLUIPA sentiment can 
be summed up by a statement published by the National Association 
of Counties: “We fully support religious freedom, but this bill is not 
about addressing discrimination. It’s about taking control away from 
neighborhoods and giving it to Washington.”71 Critics also argue that 
Employment Division v. Smith was wrongly decided and that legislation is 
not the correct way to protect religious beliefs.72 
 There have been numerous challenges to the constitutionality and 
application of RLUIPA since its passage.73 For example, in Civil Liberties 
for Urban Believers v. Urban Believers of Chicago, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit avoided an inquiry into the constitutionality of 
RLUIPA by finding that it did not apply to an association of religious 
groups challenging the Chicago Zoning Ordinance as a violation of 
                                                                                                                      
appear to have adopted this standard as well. MacLean, supra note 8, at 1. However, Su-
preme Court decisions also provide guidance in interpreting what would constitute a sub-
stantial burden on religion. Curtin & Talbert, supra, at 55; see Lyng v. Nw. Indian Ceme-
tery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 449–50 (1988); Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. 
Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717–18 (1981); see also Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town 
of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1227–28 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that a finding of a substan-
tial burden under RLUIPA requires a zoning ordinance to do more than inconvenience 
the religious institution). 
66 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1). 
67 Curtin & Talbert, supra note 65, at 55. 
68 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(h). 
69 See Runyon et al., supra note 1. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 See RLUIPA.com, supra, note 6; see also Sara Smolik, Note, The Utility and Efficacy of the 
RLUIPA: Was It a Waste?, 31 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 723, 730 (2004) (noting that courts 
often avoid inquiries into RLUIPA’s constitutionality). 
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RLUIPA.74 The Supreme Court has yet to hear a case on the constitu-
tionality of the land use provisions of RLUIPA, and thus far, all lower 
courts have found it constitutional.75 In a recent case to consider 
RLUIPA’s constitutionality, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit held that RLUIPA was a valid exercise of Congress’s power un-
der the Commerce Clause and violated neither the Tenth Amendment 
nor the Establishment Clause.76 
III. State Religious Law 
 In addition to federal religious exemptions, states employ various 
methods to ensure that the government does not violate the free exer-
cise rights of religious facilities.77 Several states have promulgated legis-
lation to provide additional protections to religious facilities from state 
laws, including those laws regulating land use.78 Massachusetts has ex-
pressly protected religious institutions since 1920.79 Several other states 
have interpreted their constitutions to provide additional protections 
for the free exercise of religion from land use laws, including Michigan, 
Minnesota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin.80 
 After the Supreme Court declared RFRA unconstitutional in City of 
Boerne v. Flores, eleven states passed their own versions of RFRA to rein-
state the strict scrutiny standard stated in the Act.81 These statutes, 
                                                                                                                      
74 Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 762 (7th Cir. 
2003). 
75 Kellington, supra note 26, at 12-38 to -39; see Smolik, supra note 73, at 730. See gener-
ally Caroline R. Adams, Note, The Constitutional Validity of the Religious Land Use and Institu-
tionalized Persons Act of 2000: Will RLUIPA’s Strict Scrutiny Survive the Supreme Court’s Strict 
Scrutiny?, 70 Fordham L. Rev. 2361 (2002) (discussing the constitutional debate over 
RLUIPA); Ada-Marie Walsh, Note, Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000: 
Unconstitutional and Unnecessary, 10 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 189 (2001) (suggesting 
RLUIPA is unconstitutional). For a brief period of time, one district court in California 
held that the land use provisions of RLUIPA were unconstitutional. See Elsinore Christian 
Ctr. v. City of Lake Elsinore, 291 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1102 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (finding RLUIPA 
unconstitutional because it exceeded Congress’s powers under the Commerce Clause). 
However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected this argument in Guru 
Nanak Sikh Society of Yuba City v. County of Sutter. 456 F.3d 978, 981 (9th Cir. 2006). 
76 Westchester Day School v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338, 354–57 (2d Cir. 2007). 
77 See Runyon et al., supra note 1. 
78 Id. 
79 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40A, § 3 (2006). 
80 See The Council on Religious Freedom and Sidley Austin Brown Wood’s Re-
ligious Institutions Group, Questions and Answers About State Religious Free-
dom Acts 3 (2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter Council on Religious Freedom]. 
81 See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 41-1493 to -1493.02 (2005); Conn. Gen. Stat. 
§ 52-571b (2000); Fla. Stat. §§ 761.01–.05 (2006); Idaho Code Ann. §§ 73-401 to -404 
(2006); 775 Ill. Comp. Stat. 35/1-99 (2003); Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 1.302, .307 (Supp. 2007); 
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however, are not uniform. For example, the Texas and Oklahoma 
RFRAs address zoning in separate sections from other uses and, thus, 
may provide that zoning is exempt from free exercise.82 Specifically, the 
Texas RFRA states that local governments do not lose authority with 
regard to “zoning, land use planning, traffic management, urban nui-
sance or historic preservation.”83 This provision, as well as a similar law 
in Oklahoma, was enacted to reduce the confusion of local land use 
advocates and to avoid a loss of municipal control.84 
 Several states have considered, but not passed, similar legislation, 
while others have not introduced RFRA-like legislation at all.85 Prior to 
RLUIPA, states without specific legislative protection for religious insti-
tutions generally relied on the potentially unclear combination of the 
Smith standard and state case law to determine whether free exercise of 
religion was unduly burdened by land use laws.86 Proponents of state 
RFRAs have argued that many states have not sufficiently interpreted 
their constitutions in terms of religious freedom protections.87 Massa-
chusetts and Washington offer instructive examples of how states ad-
dress free exercise challenges to land use without RLUIPA. 
A. Religious Zoning Exemptions in Massachusetts 
1. The Dover Amendment 
 Prior to the enactment of RFRA and RLUIPA, Massachusetts passed 
its own version of legislation providing religious exemptions from land-
                                                                                                                      
N.M. Stat. §§ 28-22-1 to -5 (Supp. 2002); R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 42-80.1-1 to -4 (Supp. 2006); 
S.C. Code Ann. §§ 1-32-10 to -60 (2005). Alabama employed another tactic, passing an 
amendment to the state constitution that provided similar protections. Ala. Const. art. I, 
§ 301 (2006). 
82 See Okla. Stat. tit. 51, §§ 251–258 (Supp. 2007); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 
§§ 110.001–.012 (Vernon 2006); Daniel N. Price, Note, The Constitutional Standard for Zon-
ing Cases Under the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 6 Tex. F. on C.L. & C.R. 365, 370 
(2002). 
83 Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 110.010. 
84 Price, supra note 82, at 371; see Hamilton, supra note 4, at 109. 
85 See Runyon et al., supra note 1. Legislatures in Arizona, California, Louisiana, Michi-
gan, Maryland, Missouri, New York, and Oregon introduced bills that would have imple-
mented additional state protections for religious free exercise. Id. All bills were either 
withdrawn or failed to pass. Id. 
86 See Douglas Laycock, State RFRAs and Land Use Regulation, 32 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 755, 
763–69 (1999); Roman P. Storzer & Anthony P. Picarello, Jr., The Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000: A Constitutional Response to Unconstitutional Zoning Prac-
tices, 9 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 929, 944 (2001). 
87 Council on Religious Freedom, supra note 80, at 3. 
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use regulation.88 Massachusetts General Law chapter 40A, section 3, 
commonly known as the Dover Amendment, enumerates these exemp-
tions.89 The purpose of the Dover Amendment is to prevent discrimina-
tion by prohibiting municipalities from giving a nonreligious facility 
preference over a religious facility.90 The Dover Amendment states: 
No zoning ordinance or by-law shall . . . prohibit, regulate or 
restrict the use of land or structures for religious purposes . . . 
provided, however, that such land or structures may be subject 
to reasonable regulations concerning the bulk and height of 
structures and determining yard sizes, lot area, setbacks, open 
space, parking and building coverage requirements.91 
While the Dover Amendment provides leeway for protected uses, in-
cluding religious uses, developers of such projects are still required to 
comply with basic zoning regulations unless a developer of a religious 
use project can demonstrate that it would be too burdensome for the 
religious institution to comply.92 A municipality may not provide a reli-
gious institution with blanket exemptions from zoning laws or prevent a 
religious institution from complying with all land use controls.93 
 The burden of proof in a Dover Amendment challenge to a zon-
ing restriction falls on the plaintiff, typically the religious institution.94 
A plaintiff must prove that “compliance with the requirements would 
substantially diminish or detract from the usefulness of a proposed 
structure, or impair the character of the institution’s campus, without 
                                                                                                                      
88 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40A, § 3 (2006). 
89 Id.; see Bible Speaks v. Bd. of Appeals, 391 N.E.2d 279, 283 n.10 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1979). Attorney General v. Inhabitants of Dover was the first case to test Massachusetts General 
Laws chapter 40A, section 3, the namesake of the Dover Amendment, where the Attorney 
General of Massachusetts challenged the town of Dover’s bylaw that permitted only non-
sectarian educational uses in residential zones. 100 N.E.2d 1, 2 (Mass. 1951). The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit invalidated the portion of the Dover bylaw that con-
flicted with the statute, finding that the Dover Amendment was “intended as an expression 
of a general policy to take away from all municipalities all power to limit the use of land for 
church or other religious purposes or for religious, sectarian, or denominational educa-
tional purposes.” Id. at 3. 
90 Bible Speaks, 391 N.E.2d at 283 n.10. 
91 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40A, § 3. 
92 18A Douglas A. Randall & Douglas E. Franklin, Massachusetts Practice, 
Muncipal Law and Practice § 17.6 (5th ed. 2006). 
93 Campbell v. City Council, 616 N.E.2d 445, 449 (Mass. 1993). 
94 See 28 Arthur L. Eno, Jr. & William V. Hovey, Massachusetts Practice, Real 
Estate Law § 23.32 & n.4 (4th ed. 2004). 
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appreciably advancing the municipality’s legitimate concerns.”95 In 
seeking a balance between municipal concerns and prevention of dis-
crimination, courts have enforced restrictions consistent with “promot-
ing public health or safety, preserving the character of [a] neighbor-
hood, or . . . other purposes” served by local zoning.96 
 While legal analysis of the Dover Amendment’s protections is per-
formed on a case-by-case basis, some factors exist to guide a court in its 
review.97 For example, a court must consider the religious institution’s 
overall use of the structure, not merely the function of each part of the 
structure, when conducting an analysis of whether that structure is pro-
tected by the Dover Amendment.98 This approach ensures that separate 
functions within a religious facility are protected, including kitchens, 
parking lots, and steeples.99 Another factor relevant to the inquiry is 
whether the regulation would impair the character of the use.100 
 Although judges are not permitted to determine whether a spe-
cific aspect of a structure serves a religious function, they may inquire 
whether the entire structure serves a religious purpose.101 For example, 
in Needham Pastoral Counseling Center, Inc. v. Board of Appeals, the Massa-
chusetts Court of Appeals found that a counseling center run by the 
Congregational Church of Needham that was open to the general pub-
lic did not serve a religious purpose, but instead resembled a mental 
health center.102 Because a determination of religious purpose depends 
on the use of the facility, not on the sponsoring organization, the 
Needham Pastoral Counseling Center did not qualify for zoning ex-
emptions under the Dover Amendment.103 The Court of Appeals also 
provided some guidance regarding what could be considered a reli-
gious activity or purpose.104 It stated that religious activity is not merely 
prayer and worship, but rather some “system of belief, concerning 
                                                                                                                      
95 Trs. of Boston Coll. v. Bd. of Aldermen, 793 N.E.2d 387, 391–92 (Mass. App. Ct. 
2003); see Eno & Hovey, supra note 94, § 23.32 & n.4. 
96 Randall & Franklin, supra note 92, § 17.6. 
97 See Trs. of Tufts Coll. v. City of Medford, 616 N.E.2d 433, 438 (Mass. 1993); Randall 
& Franklin, supra note 92, § 17.6. 
98 Worcester County Christian Commc’ns, Inc. v. Bd. of Appeals, 491 N.E.2d 634, 637 
(Mass. App. Ct. 1986). 
99 Martin v. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints, 747 N.E.2d 131, 138 (Mass. 2001). 
100 Trs. of Tufts Coll., 616 N.E.2d at 439; Trs. of Boston Coll., 793 N.E.2d at 396. 
101 Martin, 747 N.E.2d at 139; Needham Pastoral Counseling Ctr., Inc. v. Bd. of Ap-
peals, 557 N.E.2d 43, 47 (Mass. App. Ct. 1990). 
102 557 N.E.2d at 46. 
103 Id. at 47. 
104 See id. at 45, 47. 
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more than the earthly and temporal, to which the adherent is faith-
ful.”105 
 The Dover Amendment does not prevent a municipality from ex-
ercising discretion in the special permit process.106 Reasonable zoning 
regulations may be applied to a religious or educational institution that 
seeks a special permit.107 A municipality, however, is forbidden from 
discriminating against a special permit application under the “guise of 
regulating bulk and dimensional requirements.”108 One recent case 
decided under the Dover Amendment may have further extended the 
scope of religious protection in Massachusetts to rival protections 
granted under RLUIPA.109 
2. Massachusetts’s Example: Martin v. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop 
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints 
 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) directly ad-
dressed the application of the Dover Amendment to restrictions 
placed on a proposed religious construction project in Martin v. Cor-
poration of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints.110 Martin involved a challenge to a maximum height restriction 
for parcels zoned as single residence-A (SR-A) in Belmont, Massachu-
setts.111 A religious structure is a use by right in SR-A, but the religious 
institution must still comply with numerous zoning restrictions.112 The 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints sought to develop a nine-
acre wooded lot into a new temple.113 The temple, as approved by the 
zoning board, was eighty-three feet high, including a ten-foot tall 
statue of the Angel Moroni.114 The Belmont zoning bylaws for parcels 
                                                                                                                      
105 Id. 
106 Trs. of Boston Coll. v. Bd. of Aldermen, 793 N.E.2d 387, 393 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003). 
Thus, a special permit allows the zoning board to attach conditions to a use that is built 
into a zone. Burke, supra note 17, at 143. 
107 Trs. of Boston Coll., 793 N.E.2d at 393. 
108 Bible Speaks v. Bd. of Appeals, 391 N.E.2d 279, 285 (Mass. 1979); Trs. of Boston Coll., 
793 N.E.2d at 393. 
109 See Martin v. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints, 747 N.E.2d 131, 134 (Mass. 2001); Edith Netter, The View from Belmont, Massa-
chusetts, 53 Land Use L. & Zoning Dig., Sept. 2001, at 8, 9. 
110 747 N.E.2d at 133. 
111 Id. at 133–34. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 133. 
114 Id. at 134. As the court notes, the Angel Moroni is a central religious symbol for the 
church, similar in importance to the Christian cross. Id. at 134 n.7. Further, the zoning 
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of comparable size permitted a building height of no more than sixty 
feet with steeples of no more than eleven feet, two inches.115 
 The Church petitioned the Belmont zoning board for either a spe-
cial permit to allow its steeple to exceed the maximum height require-
ment or for “a determination that application of the bylaw’s height re-
striction to the steeple would violate the Dover Amendment.”116 After 
several months of public hearings, the zoning board determined that 
the height restriction would violate the Dover Amendment as applied to 
the Church.117 It found that there was “no grave municipal concern” 
and that the Church should be accommodated under the circum-
stances.118 Once the board granted a special permit to the Church, 
plaintiffs, who owned properties abutting the proposed temple site, filed 
suit in Massachusetts Superior Court.119 The Superior Court judge ruled 
in favor of plaintiffs, finding that “neither the presence nor the height 
of the steeple represents a necessary element of the Mormon relig-
ion.”120 
 The SJC granted certiorari and reversed the decision of the Su-
perior Court.121 It found several reversible errors.122 First, the trial 
judge improperly focused on whether the steeple itself was a religious 
use; the SJC determined that the Dover Amendment applied to the 
use of the land as a whole or a structure thereon, rather than a por-
tion thereof.123 The SJC noted that if it employed a narrow construc-
tion of the Dover Amendment and analyzed each part of a structure, 
elements such as church kitchens and parking lots would not be pro-
tected.124 Thus, the SJC held that although the trial court may have 
focused on the steeple because it was the only part of the temple that 
did not comply with zoning requirements, this narrow approach was 
an improper interpretation of the statute.125 
                                                                                                                      
board recognized that the ascension toward heaven is a part of Mormon theology. Id. at 
137. 
115 Id. at 133–34. 
116 Martin, 747 N.E.2d at 134. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 135. A person aggrieved by a zoning board decision may appeal to the supe-
rior court. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40A, § 17 (2006). 
120 Martin, 747 N.E.2d at 137 (internal quotations omitted). 
121 Id. at 133. 
122 Id. at 137–38. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 138. 
125 Id. 
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 Moreover, the SJC found error with the trial judge’s determina-
tion that the proposed temple’s steeple did not serve a religious pur-
pose.126 The court held that the trial judge correctly determined that 
a religious purpose is “something in aid of a system of faith and wor-
ship,” but that the inquiry into whether the steeple served a religious 
purpose was prohibited by the First Amendment.127 The SJC held that 
the trial judge should have taken the inquiry only as far as was neces-
sary to determine that temples are “places where Mormons conduct 
their sacred ceremonies.”128 Further inquiry required the judge to 
determine the validity of tenets of the religion, and the First Amend-
ment prohibited such an inquiry.129 
 Additionally, the SJC found that the Superior Court erred in re-
quiring that the church prove that the height restrictions placed on the 
temple by the bylaw were unreasonable.130 A requirement is unreason-
able when it “detracts from the usefulness of a structure[,] impose[s] 
excessive costs[,] or . . . impair[s] the character of the proposed struc-
ture.”131 While the lower court determined that the church should not 
receive an exemption because it had not shown that the height restric-
tion would prevent or diminish the temple’s usefulness, the SJC held 
that the judge should have considered whether the height restriction 
would reduce the character of the temple with respect to its exempted 
use as a religious facility.132 
 In conducting its inquiry under the Dover Amendment, the SJC 
found that the lower court incorrectly dismissed aesthetic and architec-
tural beauty as valid factors in making a determination about the inclu-
sion of the steeple.133 The SJC determined that, rather than a steeple 
being a minor facet of a temple, “[A] steeple is the precise architectural 
feature that most often makes the public identify the building as a reli-
gious structure.”134 Moreover, the SJC decided that even if the steeple 
                                                                                                                      
126 Martin, 747 N.E.2d at 138. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 138–39. 
131 Peter A. Spellios, Zoning: The Dover Amendment: Martin v. The Corporation of the 
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 87 Mass. L. Rev. 128, 
129 (2003); see Martin, 747 N.E.2d at 139. 
132 Martin, 747 N.E.2d at 139. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 140. 
574 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 35:557 
were not central to Mormon religious doctrine, this inquiry should not 
be a defining factor in a Dover Amendment case.135 
 Under the language of the Dover Amendment, the inquiry into 
the reasonableness of the requirement is typically balanced against a 
legitimate municipal concern.136 In Martin, however, the SJC and the 
Belmont Zoning Board balanced the reasonableness of the require-
ment against a critical or grave municipal concern.137 According to one 
critic of the SJC’s decision in Martin, this higher standard is not found 
in the text of the law, but instead resembles RLUIPA’s requirement that 
the government show a compelling governmental interest.138 
B. Religious Exemptions from Land Use Controls in Washington 
 Unlike Massachusetts, Washington relies on a series of three cases 
to form the backbone of analysis for conflicts between land use regu-
lations and religious freedom.139 These cases work in concert with the 
Washington State Constitution, which provides broader protections to 
land use regulations than the U.S. Constitution.140 Two of the three 
cases originated from a single lawsuit filed by the First Covenant 
Church, which sought to overturn a decision by the City of Seattle 
that designated the church as an historic landmark and prevented the 
church from making changes to the exterior of the structure.141 
 In First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle (First Covenant I ), 
the Washington Supreme Court (WSC) held that the historic landmark 
designation burdened the free exercise of First Covenant Church.142 
The Supreme Court, however, granted certiorari and vacated the deci-
                                                                                                                      
135 Id. 
136 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40A, § 3 (2006); see Netter, supra note 109, at 9. 
137 747 N.E.2d at 134, 140; see Netter, supra note 109, at 9. 
138 Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1)(B) 
(2000); see Netter, supra note 109, at 9. 
139 See generally First United Methodist Church v. Hearing Exam’r, 916 P.2d 374 (Wash. 
1996); First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle (First Covenant II ), 840 P.2d 174 
(Wash. 1992); First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle (First Covenant I ), 787 P.2d 
1352 (Wash. 1990), vacated, 499 U.S. 901 (1991) (together, providing the framework for 
Washington’s free exercise protections). 
140 Wash. Const. art. I, § 11; Darren E. Carnell, Zoning Churches: Washington State Con-
stitutional Limitations on the Application of Land Use Regulations to Religious Buildings, 25 Seat-
tle U. L. Rev. 699, 703 (2002). The Washington State Constitution reads, in relevant part, 
“Absolute freedom of conscience in all matters of religious sentiment, belief and worship, 
shall be guaranteed to every individual, and no one shall be molested or disturbed in per-
son or property on account of religion.” Wash. Const. art. I, § 11. 
141 First Covenant II, 840 P.2d at 177; First Covenant I, 787 P.2d at 1353. 
142 787 P.2d at 1353–54. 
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sion of the WSC following the change in free exercise jurisprudence in 
Employment Division v. Smith.143 In First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of 
Seattle (First Covenant II ), the WSC distinguished First Covenant II from 
Smith and relied on the state constitution to reinstate its holding in First 
Covenant I—that the historic landmark designation interfered with First 
Covenant Church’s right to free exercise of religion.144 In a third case, 
First United Methodist Church v. Hearing Examiner, the WSC held that the 
church’s lawsuit was ripe for review, even though First United Method-
ist Church filed when the city began the historic landmark designation 
process, rather than waiting for its conclusion.145 
 In analyzing a religious land use case in Washington, the courts ap-
ply strict scrutiny to the actions of the municipality accused of burden-
ing the religious institution.146 First, Washington courts must determine 
whether the “parties have a sincere religious belief.”147 This standard 
does not allow a judge free rein to determine whether a religious belief 
is reasonable.148 Instead, the religious institution “must prove only that 
their religious convictions are sincere and central to their beliefs.”149 
Washington relied on Supreme Court precedent to establish this stan-
dard of review for a sincere religious belief.150 
 The second test under the Washington analysis is “whether the 
challenged enactment or action constitutes a burden on the free ex-
ercise of religion.”151 Here, the courts rely on the analysis from the 
three cases, particularly First Covenant II.152 If a statute is found to have 
a coercive effect on the practice of a person’s religion, then it unduly 
                                                                                                                      
143 City of Seattle v. First Covenant Church of Seattle, 499 U.S. 901, 901 (1991). See gen-
erally Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1989) (eliminating the applicability of strict 
scrutiny analysis in free exercise cases where a generally neutral law is at issue). 
144 First Covenant II, 840 P.2d at 177; see Smith, 494 U.S. at 872. 
145 First United Methodist Church v. Hearing Exam’r, 916 P.2d 374, 376–378 (Wash. 
1996). 
146 Munns v. Martin, 930 P.2d 318, 321 (Wash. 1997). 
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
149 Backlund v. Bd. of Comm’rs of King County Hospital, 724 P.2d 981, 985 (Wash. 
1986). 
150 See Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 
(1981); Barnette v. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ., 47 F. Supp. 251, 253 (S.D.W. Va. 1942), aff’d, 
319 U.S. 624 (1943); Munns, 930 P.2d at 321. 
151 Munns, 930 P.2d at 321. 
152 Id.; First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle (First Covenant II ), 840 P.2d 
174, 187 (Wash. 1992); see First United Methodist Church v. Hearing Exam’r, 916 P.2d 374, 
378 (Wash. 1996); First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle (First Covenant I ), 787 
P.2d 1352, 1357 (Wash. 1990), vacated, 499 U.S. 901 (1991). 
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burdens that person’s free exercise of religion.153 A statute can be un-
duly burdensome even if it is facially neutral, so long as the petitioner 
can show that it is burdensome on his particular religious practice.154 
 Finally, if a petitioner can show that the government action is un-
duly burdensome on his religious beliefs, then the government may 
offset the burden by showing a compelling state interest.155 In Munns v. 
Martin, the WSC acknowledged that there are numerous compelling 
governmental interests, some of which have not yet been tested by the 
courts.156 However, the court noted that compelling state interests are 
“based in necessities of national or community life such as clear threats 
to public health, peace, and welfare.”157 Even if the state shows that it 
has a compelling state interest, this third inquiry does not immediately 
end—the state must also demonstrate that it used the least restrictive 
possible means to achieve its purpose.158 
 Most cases in Washington that have addressed the conflict be-
tween land use regulations and religious freedom have involved chal-
lenges to historic preservation laws.159 However, in a recent case con-
cerning a church’s application for a special permit, the WSC held that 
the local government has some discretion when land use regulations 
encounter religion.160 
1. Washington’s Example: Open Door Baptist Church v. Clark County 
 The parcel of land at issue in Open Door Baptist Church v. Clark 
County was located in a rural estate (RE) zoning district.161 The conflict 
arose after Open Door Baptist Church failed to obtain a conditional 
use permit.162 Open Door received a notice of RE violation, which re-
quired the church to either “cease all business activities or apply for a 
                                                                                                                      
153 First Covenant II, 840 P.2d at 187; Witters v. Comm’n for the Blind, 771 P.2d 1119, 
1123 (Wash. 1989). 
154 Munns, 930 P.2d at 321; First Covenant II, 840 P.2d at 187. 
155 Munns, 930 P.2d at 321. 
156 Id. 
157 Id.; see First Covenant II, 840 P.2d at 187. 
158 Munns, 930 P.2d at 321; First Covenant II, 840 P.2d at 187. 
159 Carnell, supra note 140, at 705; see First United Methodist Church v. Hearing 
Exam’r, 916 P.2d 374, 378 (Wash. 1996); First Covenant II, 840 P.2d at 177; First Covenant 
Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle (First Covenant I ), 787 P.2d 1352, 1353 (Wash. 1990), 
vacated, 499 U.S. 901 (1991). 
160 Carnell, supra note 140, at 705; see Open Door Baptist Church v. Clark County, 995 
P.2d 33, 41 (Wash. 2000). 
161 995 P.2d at 35. 
162 Id. at 34. 
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conditional use permit within ten days.”163 Although a church originally 
occupied the parcel, the structure had been used as an art school for 
the twelve years prior to Open Door’s purchase of the land.164 In a 
hearing where Open Door disputed the need for a conditional use 
permit, the hearing examiner found that the building’s right to be con-
sidered a nonconforming use without a conditional permit expired 
when it ceased to be used as a church during the twelve years prior to 
Open Door’s purchase.165 
 Open Door appealed the decision of the hearing examiner to the 
Clark County Superior Court.166 The Superior Court found that the 
permitting process improperly denied Open Door its rights because the 
hearing examiner did not observe the appropriate legal standards.167 
Clark County appealed the decision, and a panel of the Second Division 
of the Washington Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the require-
ment of obtaining a conditional use permit did not impose an unconsti-
tutional burden on Open Door.168 The Court of Appeals held that if 
Open Door were denied a conditional use permit, then it could again 
challenge the decision.169 Open Door petitioned the WSC for review.170 
After granting review, the WSC affirmed the appellate court’s decision, 
finding that requiring the church to obtain a conditional use permit did 
not constitute a burden on Open Door’s freedom of religious exer-
cise.171 
 The WSC held that requiring a church to merely alert its 
neighbors of its intent to relocate into the neighborhood is the same 
standard that any construction project necessitating a special use per-
mit must meet.172 Because nonconforming uses are not permitted to 
convert into another type of nonconforming use, it was not unreason-
able to require Open Door to obtain a conditional use permit.173 The 
court reached this conclusion even though the Washington Constitu-
tion provides broader protection for free exercise than the U.S. Consti-
                                                                                                                      
163 Id. at 35. 
164 Id. at 37. 
165 Id. at 35. 
166 Id. 
167 Open Door Baptist Church, 995 P.2d at 35. 
168 Id. at 36. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. at 48. 
172 Id. at 37. 
173 Open Door Baptist Church, 995 P.2d at 37; Anderson v. Island County, 501 P.2d 594, 
601 (Wash. 1972); Coleman v. Walla Walla, 266 P.2d 1034, 1036 (Wash. 1954). 
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tution.174 Applying the factors enumerated in Munns, the WSC found 
that there was no question as to whether Open Door had a “sincere re-
ligious belief.”175 The WSC did find, however, that Open Door’s peti-
tion failed under the second prong of Munns because there was not a 
burden on the free exercise of religion.176 Open Door’s suit was too 
prospective because the church had not even applied for a special 
permit before filing its claim; it had merely speculated that that the 
permit would not be granted.177 
 To establish a successful claim, Open Door first would have 
needed to exhaust its administrative remedies by applying for an ad-
ministrative permit.178 The church could continue its nonconforming 
use until the resolution of the permit process.179 Because the Court of 
Appeals found that the county must reduce or waive the permit fee if 
Open Door showed an inability to pay, the church’s burden was “a bit 
threadbare and based upon little more than the inconvenience of fill-
ing out paperwork.”180 Finally, the WSC found that even if Open Door 
suffered a burden on its free exercise of religion, a less restrictive al-
ternative to requiring Open Door to file an application and follow the 
administrative process did not exist.181 By requiring religious institu-
tions to follow the administrative process, the WSC sought to ensure 
that religious institutions did not end up “exempt from zoning . . . as 
a practical matter.”182 The WSC concluded by reiterating that a denial 
of Open Door’s conditional use permit application might enable the 
church to prevail on a future free exercise claim.183 
                                                                                                                      
174 Open Door Baptist Church, 995 P.2d at 38; First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of 
Seattle (First Covenant II ), 840 P.2d 174, 189 (Wash. 1992). 
175 Open Door Baptist Church, 995 P.2d at 38; Munns v. Martin, 930 P.2d 318, 321 (Wash. 
1997). 
176 Open Door Baptist Church, 995 P.2d at 42; Munns, 930 P.2d at 321. 
177 Open Door Baptist Church, 995 P.2d at 42. 
178 Id. 
179 Id.; see First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle (First Covenant I ), 787 P.2d 
1352, 1356 (Wash. 1990), vacated, 499 U.S. 901 (1991). 
180 Open Door Baptist Church, 995 P.2d at 43. 
181 Id. at 46. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. at 48. 
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IV. Is RLUIPA Necessary, or Can States Handle Religious  
Land-Use Jurisprudence on Their Own? 
 Since the enactment of RLUIPA in 2000, at least fifty separate 
cases have raised issues that concern its statutory provisions.184 This 
number is in addition to the many conflicts where the mere mention 
of RLUIPA was sufficient to encourage local governments to concede 
to religious facilities to avoid litigation.185 Critics of RLUIPA have ar-
gued that its passage has spurred churches to test their boundaries, 
creating unnecessary religious land use litigation.186 However, many of 
the vocal critics of RLUIPA represent interest groups affiliated with 
planning and local government.187 Although RLUIPA expressly states 
that it does not preempt state laws, its existence may result in religious 
land uses receiving different treatment from other land uses.188 
 Interactions between RLUIPA and local religious land use regula-
tions vary greatly between states that protect religious land uses through 
legislation or other protective measures and states that have not created 
protections for religious land use.189 In states that have protections for 
religious land uses, there are few differences, if any, in the analysis and 
outcome of religious land use issues.190 However, in states without addi-
tional protections for religious land uses, religious groups may reach 
more favorable results under RLUIPA than under state law analysis.191 In 
these states, not only is the analysis entirely different, but the outcomes 
under RLUIPA may be directly contrary to the outcome of litigation 
analyzed solely under state laws.192 
 While RLUIPA provides states with broad federal protection of reli-
gious land use, it also removes states from the process of addressing reli-
gious land use issues by effectively preempting state law.193 Even though 
RLUIPA specifically states that it does not preempt other laws, religious 
institutions can choose to raise a claim under RLUIPA, rather than risk 
the uncertainty of their own states’ RFRA provisions or case law when 
                                                                                                                      
184 See RLUIPA.com, supra note 6. 
185 See Hamilton, supra note 4, at 98; RLUIPA.com, supra note 6. 
186 See Hamilton, supra note 4, at 97–98; Runyon et al., supra note 1. 
187 Runyon et al., supra note 1. 
188 Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc, 
2000cc-1 (2000); Hamilton, supra note 4, at 97. 
189 See Council on Religious Freedom, supra note 80, at 3. 
190 See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
191 See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
192 See id. 
193 See Runyon et al., supra note 1; see also Hamilton, supra note 4, at 78–110 (provid-
ing a harsh criticism of religious land use laws, including RFRA and RLUIPA). 
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dealing with religious land use conflicts.194 Moreover, this difference in 
state and federal protections is even greater in states that considered, 
but did not pass, their own RFRAs, thereby choosing not to extend 
heightened protection to religious land uses.195 Without RLUIPA, land 
use decisions in states that intentionally did pass state RFRAs would be 
guided by the rational basis review under the Employment Division v. Smith 
test instead of the strict scrutiny of RLUIPA.196 Unless a law was specifi-
cally targeted at discrimination against religion, a religious property 
would be guided by the same regulations as any secular property.197 
A. States That Have Protections for Religious Land Uses in Place 
1. Comparing the Policies Behind RLUIPA, the Dover Amendment, 
and the Washington Analysis 
 Most states with statutory or case law protections of religious land 
use share the objective articulated in RLUIPA: to provide religious or-
ganizations with protection from discriminatory land-use regulation.198 
For example, both RLUIPA and the Dover Amendment are intended to 
protect religious land uses from discrimination by local government or 
                                                                                                                      
194 Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(h) 
(2000); see Okla. Stat. tit. 51, §§ 251–258 (Supp. 2007); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 
§ 110.010 (Vernon 2006); Price, supra note 82, at 366. Before RLUIPA’s passage, local gov-
ernmental lobbyists attempted to include a provision in RLUIPA that required religious insti-
tutions to exhaust the local land use process before a RLUIPA suit ripened. Hamilton, supra 
note 4, at 104–05. This provision was not included in RLUIPA; thus, a religious institution 
invoking RLUIPA does not necessarily have to exhaust all local options to have a ripe suit 
under the Act. Id. at 105. 
195 See Laycock, supra note 86, at 757. In Texas, Illinois, and California, land use lobbyists 
fought against state RFRA enactments because of concern for the changes to state land-use 
law that a state RFRA would create. Id. at 757 & nn.2, 3. Although Illinois passed a state 
RFRA, California has not done so. Governor’s Veto Message for Assembly Bill No. 1617 (Sept. 
28, 1998), 8 Assemb. J. 9647, 1997–98 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1998), available at http://www.leginfo. 
ca.gov/pub/97-98/bill/asm/ab_1601-1650/ab_1617_vt_19980928.html; Laycock, supra note 
86, at 757. 
196 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1), with Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 895 
(1990) (demonstrating the changes in standards of review brought about by RLUIPA). 
197 See Hamilton, supra note 4, at 95–96. 
198 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40A, § 3 (2006); 146 Cong. Rec. S7774-01 (daily ed. July 
13, 2000) (statements of Sens. Hatch & Kennedy); see also Runyon et al., supra note 1 (pro-
viding examples of state protections). For the purposes of this Note, the protections of 
religious land use established in Massachusetts and Washington will serve as representative 
examples. Massachusetts will be representative of states with RFRA-like statutes, and Wash-
ington will be representative of states with case law protections in place. 
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zoning boards.199 RLUIPA was intended to protect against the “highly 
individualized and discretionary processes of land use regulation.”200 
Similarly, the Dover Amendment strives to protect religion from dis-
crimination by municipalities by limiting the ability of the local gov-
ernment to give preference to a secular use over a nonsecular use.201 
 The protections created by case law in Washington serve a similar 
purpose.202 The Washington case law analysis seeks to prevent burdens 
on religious exercise by protecting religion from laws having a coercive 
effect on religious practice, including facially neutral laws.203 The WSC 
recognized that although freedom of religion is not an absolute right, 
its protections do have a preferred position.204 Although most Washing-
ton religious land use cases have dealt with repercussions from historic 
land use designations, such cases present a framework of protection 
similar to the framework found in RLUIPA and the Dover Amend-
ment.205 
 Like RLUIPA, the Dover Amendment strives to strike a balance 
between allowing religious uses and “honoring legitimate municipal 
concerns.”206 Courts that have applied the Dover Amendment have rec-
                                                                                                                      
199 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40A, § 3; 146 Cong. Rec. S7774-01 (daily ed. July 13, 2000) 
(statements of Sens. Hatch & Kennedy). Specifically, legislatures sought to ensure that 
churches were not excluded from locating in places where other large groups congregated 
for secular purposes. Id. One of the primary concerns in enacting RLUIPA was to ensure that 
local governments could not avoid prohibitions against exclusionary religious zoning by 
stating some illusory basis for the denial of a permit. Id. By subjecting actions of local gov-
ernment to strict scrutiny, RLUIPA not only ensures that there must be a compelling gov-
ernmental interest, but that the interest could not be protected through a less restrictive 
means. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1)(A)–(B); 146 Cong. Rec. S7774-01 (daily ed. July 13, 2000) 
(statements of Sens. Hatch & Kennedy). Further, state and local governments are not permit-
ted to circumvent the intent of RLUIPA by defining the scope of terms within RLUIPA. 
Konikov v. Orange County, 410 F.3d 1317, 1324–25 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam); Midrash 
Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1229–31 (11th Cir. 2004). 
200 146 Cong. Rec. S7774-01 (daily ed. July 13, 2000) (statements of Sens. Hatch & 
Kennedy). 
201 Bible Speaks v. Bd. of Appeals, 391 N.E.2d 279, 283 n.10 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979). 
202 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1); Munns v. Martin, 930 P.2d 318, 321 (Wash. 1997). 
203 First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle (First Covenant II ), 840 P.2d 174, 
187 (Wash. 1992); see First United Methodist Church v. Hearing Exam’r, 916 P.2d 374, 378 
(Wash. 1996); First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle (First Covenant I ), 787 P.2d 
1352, 1357 (Wash. 1990), vacated, 499 U.S. 901 (1991). 
204 First Covenant I, 787 P.2d at 1356; see Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 
(1943). 
205 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40A, § 3 (2006); First Covenant II, 
840 P.2d at 183. 
206 Martin v. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints, 747 N.E.2d 131, 137 (Mass. 2001); see Trs. of Tufts Coll. v. Medford, 616 N.E.2d 433, 
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ognized that local zoning regulations are designed to be uniformly en-
forceable; just as local governments should not uniformly discriminate 
against religious uses, they should not uniformly allow religious uses to 
be built without exercising discretion.207 Washington courts have also 
recognized the need to balance the concerns of religious institutions 
with those of the local government.208 In Open Door Baptist Church v. 
Clark County, the court determined that allowing the plaintiff to pro-
ceed without a conditional use permit would “add too much weight to 
one side of the scale.”209 Thus, although RLUIPA, the Dover Amend-
ment, and the Washington cases express their protections for religious 
land uses in different ways, each strives to reduce discrimination against 
religious land uses by providing an additional measure of protection 
from the individualized and discretionary processes of local land-use 
regulation.210 
2. Would Martin v. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints Be Decided Differently Under RLUIPA? 
 Martin v. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints is particularly suitable to scrutiny under RLUIPA because of the 
manner in which the Massachusetts SJC chose to analyze the case.211 
Although claims were brought under both RLUIPA and the Dover 
Amendment, the SJC declined to address the RLUIPA claim because it 
found that the decision was clear under the Dover Amendment.212 The 
SJC’s analysis in Martin was guided by the text of the Dover Amend-
ment, which prohibits regulation or restriction of “the use of land or 
structures for religious purposes.”213 Within this prohibition, the Dover 
Amendment specifically notes that “reasonable regulations concerning 
the bulk and height of structures and determining yard sizes, lot area, 
                                                                                                                      
438 (Mass. 1993); 146 Cong. Rec. S7774-01 (daily ed. July 13, 2000) (statements of Sens. 
Hatch & Kennedy). 
207 See Martin, 747 N.E.2d at 137; Campbell v. City Council, 616 N.E.2d 445, 449 (Mass. 
1993). 
208 Open Door Baptist Church v. Clark County, 995 P.2d 33, 48 (Wash. 2000); see 
Munns v. Martin, 930 P.2d 318, 326 (Wash. 1997). 
209 995 P.2d at 48. 
210 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40A, § 3; Munns, 930 P.2d at 321; 
146 Cong. Rec. S7774-01 (daily ed. July 13, 2000) (statements of Sens. Hatch & Kennedy). 
211 See 747 N.E.2d at 140. 
212 Id. Because this Note centers on the question of whether state or federal control of 
religious land use is more appropriate, it is helpful to examine what differences, if any, 
would have occurred if the SJC had chosen to examine Martin under RLUIPA, rather than 
under the Dover Amendment. 
213 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40A, § 3. 
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setbacks, open space, parking and building coverage requirements” are 
still applicable.214 In conducting its case-specific inquiry, the SJC de-
termined that the steeple height was reasonable because: (1) the stee-
ple was part of a larger structure that served a religious purpose; (2) 
the structure served a religious purpose as far as the court was permit-
ted to determine; and (3) the zoning board found that controlling the 
steeple height of churches served no municipal concern.215 
 Had the SJC analyzed Martin under RLUIPA, the court would first 
have examined whether the land use regulation placed a substantial 
burden on religion.216 If the religious institution demonstrated that a 
substantial burden existed, then the SJC would have examined whether 
the local government could show that its regulation fulfilled a compel-
ling governmental interest.217 Finally, if the government established a 
compelling governmental interest, then the court would have consid-
ered whether the method of furthering that interest was achieved by 
the least restrictive means.218 
 If the SJC had chosen to use RLUIPA to analyze Martin, only the 
first two steps of analysis under RLUIPA would have been necessary.219 
The SJC likely would have determined that the restriction on steeple 
height placed a substantial burden on the institution’s religious prac-
tice.220 Further, unless a belief is “so bizarre, so clearly nonreligious in 
motivation,” courts employing RLUIPA analysis will generally defer to a 
religious institution’s determination of what constitutes a religious be-
                                                                                                                      
214 Id. 
215 Martin, 747 N.E.2d at 138–40. 
216 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1). 
217 Id. § 2000cc(a)(1)(A). 
218 Id. § 2000cc(a)(1)(B). 
219 See id. § 2000cc(a)(1); 747 N.E.2d at 140. 
220 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1); Martin, 747 N.E.2d at 138. This conclusion assumes 
that the court would have found that separating a building into its individual elements, 
each requiring a specific religious use, would not be a feasible analysis for courts to under-
take. See id. It is possible, though unlikely, that because the SJC relied on state law to con-
clude that separating a building into each rudimentary element leads to impossible re-
sults, the court would reach a different answer under RLUIPA. See id. There is no evidence 
that any case decided under RLUIPA has broken a structure into individual elements and 
conducted its inquiries based on whether each individual element served a religious pur-
pose; rather, the cases have looked at the structure as a whole. See Blaesser et al., Fed-
eral Land Use, supra note 24, at 621–79. However, if the SJC were to employ the “effec-
tively impracticable” standard found in Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, but 
not adopted by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, then it is unlikely that the 
church could show a substantial burden. See 342 F.3d 752, 761 (7th Cir. 2003). 
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lief.221 In Martin, the church emphasized that ascendancy toward 
heaven is a specific value of the Mormon religion.222 The court likely 
would have concluded that limiting the Mormon temple congrega-
tion’s ability to express its “inspirational value” would place a substan-
tial burden on religious exercise.223 
 Assuming that the SJC were to find that the limitation on the 
church’s steeple design placed a substantial burden on religion, it 
would then have analyzed whether there was a compelling governmen-
tal interest in regulating the height of the steeple.224 Here, the zoning 
board itself did not allege a municipal concern, nor did the SJC deter-
mine that there was evidence of one.225 Instead, the zoning board con-
cluded that the steeple height exemption was reasonable “in light of 
the function of a steeple, and the importance of proportionality of 
steeple height to building height.”226 It is unlikely that the SJC would 
have drawn a different conclusion under RLUIPA, as the zoning board 
did not take issue with the proposed height of the steeple.227 
 Because the zoning board did not allege a compelling governmen-
tal interest and the SJC would have been unlikely to find one under 
RLUIPA, it would not have been necessary for the court to determine if 
restrictions on steeple height were the least restrictive means of further-
ing a compelling governmental interest.228 Based on the similarities 
between the protections under the Dover Amendment and RLUIPA, as 
well as the nature of the SJC’s analysis in Martin, the SJC probably 
would have reached the same conclusion under RLUIPA: that the zon-
ing board correctly granted the special permit allowing the taller stee-
ple.229 
                                                                                                                      
221 Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715 (1981); 
Scott v. Rosenberg, 702 F.2d 1263, 1273 (9th Cir. 1983); Blaesser et al., Federal Land 
Use, supra note 24, at 645. 
222 747 N.E.2d at 137. The SJC determined that it was inappropriate for the trial judge 
to determine that ascendancy toward heaven was “not a matter of religious doctrine” and, 
thus, concluded that a steeple could in fact be an expression of a religious belief. Id. 
223 See id. 
224 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a)(1)(A); Martin, 747 N.E.2d at 137. 
225 Martin, 747 N.E.2d at 140. 
226 Id. 
227 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1)(A); Martin, 747 N.E.2d at 140. 
228 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1)(B); Martin, 747 N.E.2d at 140. 
229 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40A, § 3 (2006); 747 N.E.2d at 
140. 
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3. Would Open Door Baptist Church v. Clark County Be Decided 
Differently Under RLUIPA? 
 Unlike in Martin, where the SJC applied a state statutory scheme 
similar to RLUIPA, in Washington, courts apply a three-part test devel-
oped by the WSC.230 When a religious land use case arises in Washing-
ton, the court first determines whether the religious institution has a 
sincere religious belief.231 Then, if the court concludes that the reli-
gious convictions at stake are “sincere and central to their beliefs,” the 
court determines whether the land use regulation has a coercive effect 
that burdens the religious practices at issue.232 Finally, if the court finds 
that the regulation is unduly burdensome, the state or municipality 
may defeat the claim by showing a compelling state interest, and that 
the government is implementing this interest through the least restric-
tive means possible.233 Although the WSC relies on its own case law 
precedent to decide religious land use cases, the test resembles that of 
RLUIPA.234 The primary difference between RLUIPA and Washington’s 
test appears to be that the latter explicitly permits the judge some, al-
beit small, discretion in determining whether a religious belief is sin-
cere.235 
 The conflict in Open Door Baptist Church v. Clark County involved a 
church that failed to apply for a conditional use permit that would 
have allowed it to continue as a nonconforming use.236 The WSC, ap-
plying its three-part test, found that the mere requirement that Open 
Door file for a permit did not constitute a burden on religion.237 The 
WSC left open the possibility, however, that denial of a conditional use 
permit might constitute a burden on religion.238 
                                                                                                                      
230 See generally First United Methodist Church v. Hearing Exam’r, 916 P.2d 374 (Wash. 
1996); First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle (First Covenant II ), 840 P.2d 174 
(Wash. 1992); First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle (First Covenant I ), 787 P.2d 
1352 (Wash. 1990), vacated, 499 U.S. 901 (1991) (providing the three-case basis for Wash-
ington’s free exercise jurisprudence). 
231 Munns v. Martin, 930 P.2d 318, 321 (Wash. 1997). 
232 First Covenant II, 840 P.2d at 187; Witters v. Comm’n for the Blind, 771 P.2d 1119, 
1123 (Wash. 1989). 
233 Munns, 930 P.2d at 321. 
234 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1); Munns, 930 P.2d at 321. 
235 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1); Munns, 930 P.2d at 321. 
236 Open Door Baptist Church v. Clark County, 995 P.2d 33, 35 (Wash. 2000). 
237 Id. at 48. 
238 Id. The WSC specifically noted that if the denial of a conditional use permit re-
quired the church to close, then the state must show a compelling state interest in denying 
the permit. Id. at 48 n.16. Open Door Baptist Church was decided less than three months 
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 If a RLUIPA analysis had been applied to the facts in Open Door 
Baptist Church, the court first would have determined whether the re-
strictions placed a substantial burden on the religious exercise of Open 
Door.239 Here, the court would probably have found that there was no 
burden placed on Open Door’s religious exercise because Open Door 
sought to avoid “even applying for a permit that would allow an other-
wise disallowed use.”240 Open Door raised two additional claims for a 
substantial burden on religion in the original case, both of which would 
also have failed under a RLUIPA analysis.241 First, Open Door claimed 
that a conditional use permit “would probably not be granted.”242 Be-
cause Open Door had not filed a permit application, the WSC, apply-
ing RLUIPA, likely would have reached the conclusion that it did using 
its three-part test; namely, that this claim was too prospective to ana-
lyze.243 
 Finally, Open Door claimed that the cost of applying for a permit 
was a financial burden.244 This argument also would have failed under 
RLUIPA, as the Court of Appeals had ordered Clark County to reduce 
or eliminate the permitting fee if Open Door showed a financial bur-
den.245 Under RLUIPA, municipalities have the option of avoiding the 
Act by “changing the policy or practice that results in a substantial bur-
den on religious exercise” through various means.246 However, even if 
the court found a substantial financial or other burden on Open 
Door’s religious freedom, it probably would still have found that Clark 
County had a compelling governmental interest.247 The court in Open 
Door Baptist Church recognized that local governments have a compel-
ling interest in upholding the residential character of a neighbor-
hood.248 Further, the court found that it was reasonable to require the 
church to go through a public permitting process where neighbors 
                                                                                                                      
before the passage of RLUIPA; thus, the WSC did not address the potential for a RLUIPA 
analysis in the case itself. 
239 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1); 995 P.2d at 40. 
240 Open Door Baptist Church, 995 P.2d at 40. 
241 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1); Open Door Baptist Church, 995 P.2d at 42. 
242 Open Door Baptist Church, 995 P.2d at 42. 
243 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1); Open Door Baptist Church, 995 P.2d at 42; First Cove-
nant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle (First Covenant I ), 787 P.2d 1352, 1356 (Wash. 
1990), vacated, 499 U.S. 901 (1991). 
244 Open Door Baptist Church, 995 P.2d at 42. 
245 Id. at 42–43. 
246 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(e). 
247 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1)(A); Open Door Baptist Church, 995 P.2d at 47. 
248 995 P.2d at 47. 
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would have the opportunity to receive notification and to comment at a 
public hearing.249 
 Finally, under the RLUIPA analysis, the court would have deter-
mined whether a less restrictive means existed for Clark County to pro-
tect its compelling governmental interest.250 Had Open Door filed for a 
conditional use permit, Clark County would have allowed it to continue 
operating its nonconforming use throughout the conditional use per-
mitting process.251 Moreover, although there was a lengthy application 
process, this process was no more burdensome than it was for a secular 
organization.252 Because local governments have an interest in being 
alerted when new nonconforming uses come into their jurisdiction, it is 
unlikely that a Washington court that was applying RLUIPA would have 
found that there was a less restrictive means available than the typical 
permit application process that still protected the governmental inter-
est.253 
B. States That Rely on Federal Law in Deciding Religious Land Use Cases 
 States that do not codify or otherwise articulate the appropriate 
test for protection of the free exercise of religion in land use cases 
must rely on the federal statutory or case law to determine whether a 
land use regulation infringes on the free exercise of religion.254 These 
states remain at the mercy of the federal statutory laws, so their reli-
gious land-use law standards have changed drastically since the Su-
preme Court decided Smith.255 
 In the time between the demise of RFRA and the enactment of 
RLUIPA, courts relied on the analysis set forth in Smith to determine 
whether a law infringed upon freedom of religion.256 The Court in 
Smith held that states are free to regulate laws that do not specifically 
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250 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1)(B). 
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target religious activities for disparate treatment.257 The only means by 
which exceptions to neutral laws—including land use regulations—may 
be granted is through the full legislative process.258 No court has found 
that typical land use regulations target religious activities; therefore, the 
Smith standards drastically reduce the ability of religious institutions to 
fight what they perceive to be discriminatorily applied laws.259 
 Instead, Smith limits the laws that religious institutions are able to 
challenge to those that facially target religious activities, an extremely 
difficult standard to meet.260 Few land use cases decided after Smith 
have been able to establish disparate treatment of religious uses to a 
degree sufficient for a court to find that the challenged law was not 
generally applicable.261 If a court were to find that a law targeted a reli-
gious practice under the Smith analysis, then that law would be required 
to protect compelling governmental interests through the least restric-
tive means feasible or it would be found unconstitutional.262 
 At least one critic of the Smith analysis notes that what constitutes a 
generally applicable law actually seems to be a law that was “enacted 
without a constitutionally forbidden motive.”263 Simply put, laws that 
are not motivated by hostility to religion in general, or hostility to a par-
ticular faith, appear to be sufficiently neutral to withstand the Smith 
analysis.264 Laws upheld under Smith include those that “enact[] special 
rules for churches, deliberately exclude[] all new churches, pick[] and 
choose[] among religious practices or appl[y] through individualized 
assessments that select churches with gross disproportion.”265 
                                                                                                                      
257 See 494 U.S. at 879. 
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 The passage of RLUIPA—as well as RFRA—shifted the burden in 
religious land use cases to local governments.266 Rather than giving the 
religious institution the heavy burden of proving religious discrimina-
tion, the local government has the burden of defeating strict scrutiny 
by showing a compelling governmental interest.267 This test, regarded 
as the “most demanding test known to constitutional law,” requires the 
local government to show that any limitations placed on the practice of 
religion are as minimal as possible while still protecting a compelling 
governmental interest.268 
1. Illustrating the Difference: Martin Under the Smith Standard 
 As illustrated in the previous subsection, it is likely that the out-
come in Martin would have remained the same if the Massachusetts SJC 
had elected to employ RLUIPA instead of the Dover Amendment in its 
analysis.269 However, the result of the case likely would have been quite 
different if the circumstances in Martin occurred in a state without its 
own protections and without RLUIPA.270 If neither RLUIPA nor the 
Dover Amendment provided greater protections than the Smith analy-
sis, it is extremely likely that the steeple height would have remained 
capped at the limit found in the zoning ordinance, unless the church 
was able to push an exception through the legislative process.271 
 Under the Smith analysis, the court would first have examined the 
law at issue in Martin.272 Although one court found that the targeted 
application of a local zoning law discriminated against a particular reli-
gious group, in general, zoning laws are considered to be laws of neu-
tral application.273 Assuming that the SJC found the restrictions on 
                                                                                                                      
266 See Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1) 
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building height to be generally applicable and facially neutral, the Mar-
tin case would likely have proceeded no further.274 Because Smith held 
that states are free to regulate through generally applicable laws that do 
not target religious practices, the church in Martin would have been 
required to show that the building height restrictions were a pretext 
used by the government to prevent religious uses, or the court’s inquiry 
would have ended.275 
2. Illustrating the Difference: Open Door Baptist Church Under the 
Smith Standard 
 Unlike Martin, the result of Open Door’s actual suit would remain 
the same if analyzed using Smith’s rational basis test.276 The prospective 
nature of Open Door’s claim would make it difficult for the church to 
prevail under any test, as success on the merits would require a court to 
determine that any permitting or notification requirement whatsoever 
constitutes an excessive burden on religion.277 While there is no differ-
ence in outcome on the actual merits of Open Door’s case under the 
Smith analysis, if Clark County were to deny Open Door the special 
permit, the Smith analysis would not provide the church with a rem-
edy.278 
 Under both Washington case law and RLUIPA, a future suit based 
on the denial of a special permit probably would have succeeded.279 
Under the Smith analysis, however, Open Door’s success in challenging 
the denial of a special permit is improbable.280 First, the court would 
have examined the law at issue—here, the requirements for a special 
permit.281 As in the Smith analysis of Martin, the court would have de-
termined that the laws concerning special permits were generally ap-
plicable and facially neutral.282 A court using the Smith analysis would 
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have ended its inquiry there.283 Thus, even though the resolution of the 
litigated issue in Open Door Baptist Church would remain the same, the 
results would be quite different if Open Door were denied a permit 
and filed a second suit as recommended by the WSC.284 
Conclusion 
 Control of land-use regulation by local government has been rec-
ognized as a means for a community to achieve “a satisfactory quality of 
life in both urban and rural communities,” while utilizing great discre-
tion.285 Although the free exercise of religion remains a constitutionally 
protected right, the increase in megachurches, offering an entire range 
of activities, from worship to education and support groups, has argua-
bly created more negatives for their neighbors. If land-use regulation is 
truly to be utilized to create “zones where family values, youth values, 
and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a sanc-
tuary for people,” then perhaps those people, through state and local 
government action, are best able to determine its implementation.286 
 While the constitutionality of RLUIPA has not been tested, several 
scholars have questioned whether RLUIPA would pass muster if the Su-
preme Court chose to analyze its constitutionality.287 As long as RLUIPA 
remains in effect, it is clear that religious land use cases will be relatively 
consistent between states with and without their own protections in 
place. By allowing religious groups to avoid state limits on religious ex-
emptions to land use, RLUIPA somewhat removes state and local gov-
ernments from decisions on regulating religious land use conflicts. Par-
ticularly in states without their own protections, RLUIPA effectively 
preempts the states’ determination of the appropriate balance between 
land use regulations and religious institutions. In effect, RLUIPA exac-
erbates conflicts between local governments and religious groups by al-
lowing religious groups to avoid state law when it conflicts with their 
goals. 
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